bling Tax. 4 This statute requires the annual purchase of a fifty dollar stamp by all professional gamblers, 5 and imposes a ten per cent excise tax upon all wagers placed with such gamblers.' In addition, the "taxpayer" must register with the District Director of Internal Revenue and reveal his places of business and the names and addresses of all persons who accept wagers for him. 7 Furthermore, the Code directs each internal revenue office to make these tax lists available to state prosecuting officers. 8 It is apparent that the practical effect of these provisions is to force the gambler to choose between openly exposing himself to state prosecutions for gambling 9 and risking federal prosecution for tax avoid-"The general provisions of this tax may be found in INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 4401-23. Unfortunately, all the pertinent provisions are not collected in one place, but are spread throughout the Code. As cited in succeeding footnotes, § § 61o7, 6653, 68o6(c), 7201, 7203, 726z and 7 z 7 3 (b) must be included to comprehend the terms of the tax fully. For a discussion of this 7statute, see Coons, The Federal Gambling Tax and the Constitution, 43 J. CRIM. L., C. & P.S. 637 (i953).
'INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 4411. "There shall be imposed a special tax of $5o per year to be paid by each person who is liable for tax under section 4401 or who is engaged in receiving wagers for or on behalf of any person so liable."
OINT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §4401. As defined in §4421, the tax is primarily directed toward bookmakers (off-track race horse betting), operators of lotteries, numbers, policy, and pools. It does not apply to poker, dice, roulette or other similar games.
Also specifically exempted by § 4402(1) are wagers placed with a parimutuel system (on-track race horse betting) licensed by a state. If this statute is truly a tax measure rather than an attempted exercise of federal police power, it is surprising that Congress should by-pass such a lucrative source of revenue. Herald, Oct. 7, 1955, P. I, col. 3 . Thus, the pressure of public opinion may force recalcitrant prosecutors to issue indictments to those named taxpayers, though there is no other substantiating evidence. That such a contingency would occur was raised in congressional debate concerning this bill. See United States v. Kahriger, 345 U.S. 22, z7 n. 3
(1952).
State prosecutors are additionally aided by § 68o6(c), which requires each stamp purchaser to post the stamp in a conspicuous spot in his principal place of business 5 and if he has none, to carry the stamp on his person and show it on request to any Treasury official. A $50 fine is imposed for negligent failure to comply with this section, and for willful neglect or failure the fine is doubled. Id. § 7 2 7 3 (b).
" With the exception of Tennessee, which classifies it as a felony, TaNN. CODE ANN. § 11290 (Williams 1934) , gambling is a misdemeanor in all states but Nevada, where every form of gambling has been legalized. The state penalties are generally not as severe as those prescribed in the federal statute for avoiding the gambling tax. For example, New Jersey penalizes a bookmaker with a fine of $xooo-$5ooo and/or one to five years in jail, N.J. STAT. ANN. tit. 2A, § 112-3 (i953). Pennsylvania specifies a maximum fine of $500 and/or one year in jail, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 1S, § 46oi (194.5)S ance."° Despite this inherent incriminatory element, two recent Supreme Court cases" have held the tax constitutional. Though the issue has thus, at least for the present, been set at rest in the federal courts, this does not foreclose an examination of the present vitality of our fifth amendment privilege as reflected by the judicial acceptance of a statute, the very design of which is to compel testimony in aid of state law enforcement. 2 and North Carolina a maximum fine of $2ooo and/or six months in prison, N.C, GEN.
STAT. § 14-290 (1953).
1" One who willfully refuses to pay this gambling tax could face a fine in excess of $15,ooo and five years in prison. § 7262 of the INT. REV. CODE OF 1954 imposes a fine of $Iooo-$5000 for failure to buy the stamp or pay the required ten per cent excise. Section 6653 prescribes an additional penalty of fifty per cent of the underpayment of the tax for willful failure to pay. § 7201 declares in addition to the above penalties that one willfully attempting to evade the payment of this tax shall, on conviction, be declared guilty of a felony and receive a maximum fine of $io,ooo and/or imprisonment for not more than five years. Finally, § 7203 punishes failure to file a return, or to keep the required records, by a maximum fine of $io,ooo and/or imprisonment for one year. The fifth amendment secures the privilege of refusing to testify both as to those matters which will directly incriminate, and as to those which may serve as a link in a "chain of evidence" culminating in conviction.'
3
In United States v. Kahriger [6:31, 14 and United States v. Lewis Senate grossly miscalculated gambling activity in our nation, or that it attempted to cloak the penalty nature of the tax. The latter seems more probable.
" The "chain of evidence" rule was first expressed in [Vol. 5: 86 [6:31,' 5 the only two Supreme Court decisions on the constitutionality of the Federal "Bookie Tax," however, the Court held that the tax did not incriminate. These decisions rested on the determination that the registration form only required information of future activity, not of prior or present criminal conduct," Justices Black, Douglas and Frankfurter, dissenting in both cases, 17 objected to this factual conclusion, 18 referring to the precise wording of questions six and seven of the registration form' 9 which each taxpayer must file: "Are you engaged in the business of accepting wagers for your own account?" and, "Do you receive wagers for or on behalf of some other person or persons?" IS 348 U.S. 419 (1955). The Lewis case involved the prosecution of a District of Columbia resident for not purchasing the fifty dollar stamp. D.C. CODE § 22-1501 (i95 ), prohibits gambling in the district. Petitioner argued that to divulge the information required on the registration form would amount to a coerced confession. He, therefore, claimed Kahriger was not controlling, since there the claim of incrimination was from the state rather than the federal government. The trial court held that the tax was unconstitutional as violative of the fifth amendment. On appeal to the municipal court of appeals, this decision was reversed; and the court, citing the district court cases discussed in note 14 supra, held the law only applied to future activities which are not within the fifth amendment's protection. United States v. Lewis, loo A.zd 40 ' The majority opinion in Kahriger, written by Mr. justice Reed, first examined the statute as a tax measure, and then the question of self-incrimination. He stated that it was doubtful whether petitioner could raise the self-incrimination issue, since he had failed to register. In United States v. Sullivan", 274 U.S. 259, 263 (1927), where defendant had refused to file an income tax return claiming it would incriminate him, the Court said, "If the form of return provided called for answers that the defendant was privileged from making he could have raised the objection in the return, but could not on that account refuse to make any return at all." The Court in Kahriger further held that the fifth amendment was not applicable to future acts wherein an individual had a free choice to violate state or federal laws or not. It should be noted that this opinion only concerned the registration and stamp part of the statute. The Court has never passed on the excise part.
DUKE BAR JOURNAL
Mr. Justice Minton, who wrote the Lewis decision, relied entirely on the Kahriger precedent.
17 Mr. Justice Jackson reluctantly concurred with the majority in Kahriger. He said, "I concur in the judgment and opinion of the Court, but with such doubt that if the minority agreed upon an opinion which did not impair legitimate use of the taxing power I probably would join it. . . . This is difficult to regard as a rational or goodfaith revenue measure, despite the deference that is due Congress. On the contrary, it seems to be a plan to tax out of existence the professional gambler whom it has been found impossible to prosecute out of existence ....
It will be a sad day for the revenues if the good will of the people toward their taxing system is frittered away in efforts to accomplish by taxation moral reforms that cannot be accomplished by direct legislation." 345 U.S. at 34-36.
28 345 U.S. at 36, 37; 348 U.S. at 421. " Special Tax Return and Application for Registry-Wagering Form i t-C, U.S. Treas., Int. Rev.
These questions are certainly not phrased prospectively; but, instead, it is quite apparent that the majority opinions did not give the words their plain meaning. State prosecutors, however, have not been bound by such a narrow construction; for, with no evidence other than this registration form, they have brought indictments against registrants for violating local gambling statutes. 2°B ut even accepting the majority's construction of the questions, a registrant might still be forced to incriminate himself under state and federal conspiracy laws. 2 ' In Acklen v. State of Tennessee 22 for example, the defendant was convicted of conspiracy to violate a state gambling statute solely on the evidence that he had purchased a tax stamp. 2 ' On appeal, the conviction was affirmed on the premise that it was reasonable to infer an intent to gamble from the purchase of the stamp. 2 " Furthermore, even assuming that the information elicited by the tax could not directly incriminate the registrant, it could undoubtedly be used to form a cumulative chain of evidence securing his conviction. 25 State prosecutors are apprised of the registrant's places of illegal activity and also of the names and addresses of everyone who collects wagers "The county district attorney, upon learning the defendant had purchased a wagering stamp, assigned a policeman to "tail" him. The policeman stopped the defendant and asked to see his driver's license. Fumbling in his pocket, he unluckily revealed a tax stamp, which the officer immediately seized. At trial, the state introduced the stamp in evidence, as well as photostatic copies of his application for the stamp.
" The court said, "It will not be gainsaid that common sense dictates the conclusion that these parties would not have gone to the trouble and expense complying with this federal law unless they fully intended to engage in the activity of which the tax was levied and paid." Id. at 104. " See note 13 supra.
for him. With this information, local officials are in a much better position to enforce state penal sanctions on gambling.
In summary, a realistic appraisal of the true nature of this tax clearly demonstrates that it does force self-incrimination both by coercing a confession of present criminal conduct and of conspiracy to carry on such activity, and by eliciting information which may form a link in a chain of evidence leading to a conviction.
THE PROTECTION OFFERED BY THE FIFTH AMENDMENT
If, in fact, the Kahriger and Lewis decisions are unrealistic and the gambling tax does compel self-incrimination, the efficacy of the fifth amendment privilege should be assayed by examining the protection which it would offer against the disclosures required by this tax. Two judicial limitations on the self-incrimination clause suggest that even the dear infringement of the clause by these registration requirements would go unchecked.
Dual Sovereignty Rule 2 "
Both the federal and state governments are prohibited by their respective constitutions from coercing testimony which would incriminate under the laws of that particular government. 7 The "dual sovereignty rule," however, allows the federal government to coerce testimony which would incriminate only under state law, and the state governments to coerce testimony which would incriminate only under federal law. 8 Similarly, under the rule, the prosecutors of each government may use testimony coerced by the other, even though such testimony could not have been used if coerced by the prosecuting government. This result is rationalized in terms of the political theory that the federal and state governments are two distinct and sovereign entities with separate judicial systems. 
FIFTH AMENDMENT
This effect of the interrelationship of federal and state governments on the privilege against self-incrimination was first examined in United States v. Saline Bank of Virginia. 29 A bill brought in a federal court to authorize examination of defendant's books by federal agents was resisted on the ground that divulgence of the data would expose defendant to criminal prosecution under state law.
0
In affirming a judgment for defendant, the Supreme Court, through Mr. Chief Justice Marshall, held that the case clearly came within the rule "that a party is not bound to make any discovery which would expose him to penalties."1 31 The Court was not at all disturbed by the fact that defendant feared incrimination under state rather than federal law.
The rule of the Saline case was not repudiated by several subsequent decisions, wherein the defendant was cited for contempt for refusing to answer questions propounded in court. In Brown v. Walker, 32 the Supreme Court, while upholding a contempt citation in a federal court, 33 implied that it would have decided differently but for the conclusion that an immunity statute barred state prosecution. 4 Similarly, in Jack v. Kansas, 35 a state court contempt citation was upheld; 3 " but the decision was rested on the great improbability of federal prosecution.Y T The z6 U.S. (I Pet.) 1oo (1878). § 46 (1946) , covering investigations under the Interstate Commerce Commission Act was passed prior to the Brown case. It granted a witness immunity from any prosecution resulting from any transaction about whfich he could testify. The decision in Brown was five to four. The dissenters thought that no immunity statute, however broad, could be valid, since Congress cannot amend the Constitution, and thus cannot force one to testify by granting immunity.
3 099 U.S. 372 (0905). "0 Defendant, when questioned before a state grand jury about alleged state antitrust violations, refused to answer, invoking the fifth and fourteenth amendments and claiming that the answers would subject him to federal prosecution. 07 The Court said that the questions asked by the state could not incriminate defendant in the federal courts, as they pertained only to state and not to federal anti-trust law. The Court noted that Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591 (1895), was decided on the assumption of the great improbability of prosecution from the other sovereign. most forceful disavowal of the dual-sovereignty rule then appeared in Ballman v. Fagin, 38 where a federal contempt conviction was before the court. 3 9 Mr. Justice Holmes, for the majority, expressly rejected the rule, and held that a refusal to testify in a federal court was clearly justified by the fear of subsequent state prosecution. 4 "' Since defendant was claiming the self-incrimination privilege for corporate records, the actual decision of the Court rested on the rule that a corporation and its records are not protected by the self-incrimination clause, as it is merely a personal privilege. See Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361 (1911). Therefore, the additional statements by the Court were not necessary for its decision. But three months after the Hale case, this immunity statute was specifically amended to restrict its application to natural persons. 34 STAT. 798 (i9o6), 15 U.s.C. § 33 (x946). "= Both cases were decided during the same Court term. 'As authority for this dual sovereignty rule, the Court cited King of Two Sicilies v. Willcox, i Sim. (N.S.) 3o, 61 Eng. Rep. 116 (Ch. s851), as the leading English case on this question. In that case, defendant was being sued in England5 and he refused to answer questions in court, fearing incrimination in Sicily. The English court ordered defendant to answer, since he had not shown that any prosecution was imminent, and since the court was not bound to know the criminal laws of a foreign country. The dual sovereignty rule could not rest on the same rationale in the United States, as the federal courts will take judicial notice of the criminal laws of the various states. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE 695 (1954 4s 284 U.S. 141 (1931) . "' This was an appeal from a dismissal by a district court of a contempt citation, resulting from defendant's refusal to disclose information about his income tax return on the ground that it would subject him to state prosecution. Though the Court, in reversing, held defendant had waived the self-incrimination privilege, they firmly announced the dual sovereignty rule. For authority, the Court cited King of Two Sicilies v. Willcox, i Sim. (N.S.) 3o, 61 Eng. Rep. 116 (Ch. 1851), for the English rule from which the self-incrimination clause got its meaning. Also cited were the prior Supreme Court cases of Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547 (189z) ; Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591 (x896); Jack v. Kansas, 199 U.S. 37z (19o5); and Hale v. Henkel, 2o U.S. 43 (i9o6). A constitutional rule of law thus developed from an English rule the Court got backwards, from the Counselman case, where nothing was said of state prosecution, and from the Brown and Jack cases, which were based on the improbability of any prosecution from the other sovereign. Hale v. Henkel had also relied on the erroneous English rule. Though the Court cited these cases as if dual sovereignty were a settled rule, two years later, after defendant had been convicted of tax fraud, and the case was DUKE BAR JOURNAL [4:3] , 5 ' confirmed the Murdock decision by ruling that testimony coerced by a state court was properly admitted in a federal prosecution. 2 Neither opinion' attempted to reconcile its result with the blunt rejection of dual sovereignty in the Saline Bank and Fagin cases.
This tortuous line of precedent from the Saline Bank case to the Court's most recent pronouncement in the Feldman case has resulted in conflicting decisions in the lower federal 5 3 and state 4 courts. The most again appealed to the Court, they said, "Not until this court pronounced judgment in United States v. Murdock... had it been definitely settled that one under examination in a federal tribunal could not refuse to answer on account of probable incrimination under ' 698-99 (1944) , and the dissents of both of them in Shapiro V. United States, 335 U.S. 1, 70-71 (1948), it seems likely they would have lined up with the minority In such event, the dual sovereignty rule might well have disappeared.
2" Mr. Justice Black dissented. "As the decisions reflect, the previously declared attitude of the Court toward this prohibition [the self-incrimination privilege] has been that it 'must have a broad construction in favor of the right it was intended to secure? .. Testimony is no less compelled because a state rather than a federal officer compels it. . . . The great principles of liberty written in the Bill of Rights cannot safely be treated as imprisoned in walls of formal logic built upon vague abstractions found in the United States Reports. . . . And history supports no argument that the framers of the Fifth Amendment were interested only in forbidding the extraction of an accused's testimony as distinguished from the use of his extracted testimony. . . . By broadly outlawing the practice of compelling such testimony the Fifth Amendment struck at this evil at its source, seeking to eliminate the possibility that compelled testimony would ever be available for use to punish a defendant." 322 U.S. at 496-5oo. "In United States v. Di Carlo, 102 F. Supp. 597 (N.D. Ohio 195z), the district court for northern Ohio rendered a decision diametrically at variance with the Murdock and Feldman cases. As part of a Kefauver investigation, defendant was questioned in an open hearing about his bookmaking operations. He refused to answer, invoking the fifth amendment, since state officials were present. The claim was based, therefore, on the fear of state, and not federal, incrimination. In the contempt proceeding before the district court, defendant's refusal was upheld. The court, citing United States V. FIFTH AMENDMENT significant objection to the dual sovereignty rule, however, is not its anomalous development, but rather its present operation.s The rule, as it applies today, imposes a pernicious limitation on the fifth amendment guarantee and reflects a perhaps unfortunate judicial antipathy to the privilege against self-incrimination.
"FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT" RULE In contrast to the first amendment, the fifth is not restricted ex vi termini to Congress or the federal government. Instead, it broadly states that no one shall be compelled to be a witness against himself. The Supreme Court in Barron v. Baltimore, 6 however, drastically inhibited the effect of this literal language by holding that all of the first eight amendments applied only to action by the federal government. 57 question raised was whether the state could coerce a confession of gambling which might then be used by the federal government to convict the defendant of evading the tax. Defendant had refused to answer the questions propounded. The lower court cited him for contempt, since he had been granted immunity from state prosecution. But the supreme court reversed, holding that the defendant did have the protection of the fifth amendment in a state court as to questions that could convict him in a pending federal suit. Unfortunately, the majority opinion does not admit that they are following the minority view in our country. 887 (Fla. 1954) , as though they represent the settled American view (see note 2o supra.). In discussing the dual sovereignty rule, the majority quotes from the Den Uyl case: "It seems like a travesty on verity to say that one is not subjected to self-incrimination when compelled to give testimony in a State judicial proceeding which testimony may forthwith be used against him in a Federal criminal prosecution." 8z So.zd at iS. The dissenters cited "See Mr. Justice Black's dissent in Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. xz8 (954), wherein he again claimed that this gambling tax violated the self-incrimination clause. Writing of dual sovereignty, he said, "I cannot agree that the Amendment's guarantee against self-incriminating testimony can be spirited away by the ingenious contrivance of using federally extorted confessions to convict of state crimes and vice versa ... This treatment of the states and the Federal Government as though they were entirely foreign to each other is wholly conceptualistic and cannot justify such a narrow interpretation of the Fifth Amendment's language and the resulting frustration of its purpose." Id. at 140. ' 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (I833). "'The question presented by the case was whether or not that part of the fifth. amendment which prevents the taking of private property for public use without just compensation applied to individual state action. The Court, in holding it did not, went further and said, "These amendments contain no expression indicating an intention to. apply them to the state governments. This court cannot so apply them." Id. at 25o. No other reason was given as the basis for this broad holding. It should be noted that the Court, with the exception of the first amendment, could easily have decided con-
The adoption of the fourteenth amendment in 1868 afforded the Supreme Court an opportunity to re-examine this position; and subsequently there evolved the doctrine that the due process clause in the fourteenth amendment "made applicable to the states" all those guarantees in the Bill of Rights which were deemed "fundamental. ' 8 Any intelligent appraisal of this doctrine, as it bears on the present inquiry, must begin with the observation that only two guarantees 9 in the Bill of Rights lend themselves to emasculation by the dual sovereignty theory. All of the other clauses would realize their fullest extent of protection by restraining the action of each political unit within its own sphere of activity. 60 The result of this phenomenon is that, for the most part, protection is extended to the ultimate limits when a guarantee is made "applicable to the states." In the case of the self-incrimination privilege, however, it might be argued that to make it "applicable to the states" would have no greater effect than to prohibit the state courts from using testimony coerced by state officials."' It is apparent, though, that the Supreme Court did not contemplate such linguistic niceties when it announced that the due process clause made all "fundamental" rights "applicable to the states." Rather, it seems that, in the case of every amendment except the first, the Court is overruling Barron v. Baltimore and reading the language of the amendment according to its literal import. If this is actually the judicial process, then a determination that the self-incrimination privilege is "fundamental" 2 would mean that a broad and unitary command should versely by writing, 'These amendments contain no expression indicating an intention not to apply them to the state governments. This court cannot so restrict them.' Such an interpretation would be more in conformity with the liberal construction afforded apply to all the United States, prohibiting the coercion of testimony without regard to where it would incriminate, and likewise prohibiting the use of coerced testimony no matter where it had been coerced. The Supreme Court in Twining v. New Jersey 3 held that the privilege against self-incrimination was not a "fundamental" right. 6 Though the effect of this decision is apparently still controlling, its soundness as an original proposition is open to question.
In determining which of the guarantees in the Bill of Rights are "fundamental," the Supreme Court has consistently looked to their historical development in England and in the colonies up to the time of the Constitutional Convention. 6 5 Though legal historians are in mild dispute as to the earliest roots of the self-incrimination privilege, 66 there is general agreement that it emerged in the fifteenth century, 67 and that by the time of the colonization of America, it was universally recognized in England as a basic liberty.
68
In conformity with this historical tradition, the privilege was accorded to everyone throughout the colonies in the eighteenth century, 6 9 and many of them incorporated specific provisions for it into their "constitutions." 7 James Madison recognized the The question presented by the case was whether a state trial court judge, pursuant to a state statute, could, consistent with the fourtenth amendment, instruct a jury that an unfavorable inference could be drawn from an accused's failure to take the stand in his owsi behalf. The Court held that the state law violated no constitutional right. Though unnecessary for the decision, the Court added that the self-incrimination privilege was not part of the "law of the land" prior to the separation of the colonies from England and, thus, not made applicable to the states by the fourteenth amendment. 
